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Introduction
Consider a forecaster who each period must predict a probability distribution over
an exogenous set of outcomes such as the weather.  The forecaster is said to be calibrated
if in the asymptotic limit, the empirical frequencies in periods where each particular
probability distribution is forecast exactly match the forecast probabilities. That is,
calibration requires that (asymptotically) it should have rained in exactly 1/3 of the
periods in which the forecast probability of rain was 1/3, and so on.
3   Recently, Foster
and Vohra (1994) proved the existence of random strategies that are approximately
calibrated to any desired degree.  That is, for any e >0, there is a randomized forecast rule
that is calibrated with probability 1-e . Their construction,  which relies on a series of
approximations, is somewhat complicated; this note provides a  shorter and simpler one.
Our proof shows that “K-initialized myopic strategies” are approximately calibrated when
K is large.  These strategies first  “initialize” by making each forecast exactly K times,
and thereafter play, in each period t,  the minmax strategy in a static game whose payoffs
depend on the history until t in a way we define below.
4
As a caveat to these results, note that calibration is a relatively weak notion:  for
example, it is a calibrated forecast to predict a 50% chance of heads when facing a
deterministic alternation between heads and tails.  However, Fudenberg and Levine
(1996) show that calibration can be extended to conditional forecasts, provided that the
number of events conditioned on does not grow to rapidly with time.
5
                                                
3 Dawid (1982) defines a stronger notion of calibration, requiring that conditional frequency predictions be
correct.  Dawid (1985) and Oakes (1985) showed that no forecasting rule can be exactly calibrated for all
possible sequences.  This stronger notion of calibration is shown by Kalai, Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1996)
to be equivalent to the more traditional version of merging.
4 There is a related  decision-theoretic notion of calibration based on actions:  a decision rule is calibrated
if every action that is used with positive frequency  earns nearly the most that was possible against the long-
run frequency of opponents’ play in periods that action was used.  Rules that are calibrated in this sense
regardless of how opponents play are studied by Fudenberg and Levine (1996) and Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996).  The analysis of Hart and Mas-Colell shows the close connection of calibration to Blackwell’s
(1956) notion of approachability.
5 See also the previous two footnotes.2
The Model 
Each period t =12 , ,..., the player chooses from a finite set of announcements
aA Î , then observes an outcome xX Î, a finite set.  Mixed actions are denoted
byaÎD() A .  To each announcement a corresponds a vector of probabilities over
outcomes of  pa X () ( ) ÎD .   We denote by l  the greatest distance (in the Euclidean
norm) of any probability vector from the set of points  pA () .  We will also write ex () for
the unit vector that  puts weight one on the outcome x.  The player’s choice in each period
t (that is, his forecast rule) can depend only on the information his information at that
time, which is the sequence of all previous pairs (,) ax tt  of announcements and
outcomes.
Given a history of announcements and outcomes up through and including date t,
we define na t ()  to be the number of times that the action a has been chosen, and  Pa t()
to be the vector whose has components are the number of times that each outcome has
occurred in the time periods when a was chosen.  Thus  Pa na X tt () / () ( ) ÎD  represents
the empirical distribution of outcomes conditional on the action a.
For any action a we may define a quadratic cost associated with that action.
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This measures the deviation of the empirical frequencies from the forecast probabilities,
weighted by the number of observations.  The overall cost is just cc a tt a = å () .  The
distribution of this random variable depends upon the strategy of both the player and
nature.  The idea is to show how to pick a t  so that Ec c tt t -- - 11   can be made smaller than
any given positive e, uniformly over histories, and regardless of the strategy  chosen by
Nature.   A standard strong law of large numbers argument then implies that almost surely
the average cost ct t /  is bounded asymptotically, and that this bound can be taken to be
arbitrarily small.  It is also straightforward to show (Foster and Vohra provide a proof)3
that the existence of  rules with arbitrarily low average cost implies the existence of rules
that are approximately  calibrated.
Main Result
Notice that given  Pn tt -- ×× 11 () ()  and  ,  ct is determined entirely by ax tt , .  Thus at
time t  we may take
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to be the payoffs in a zero- sum game in which the player picks a, and the opponent picks
x.  If ag ÎÎ DD () , () AX , we let  gt(,) ag  denote the expected value of  ga x t (,) .  Our
goal is to prove the existence of a strategy that ensures that this change in cost from
period to period is always small.    
The particular strategies we examine, called K-initialized  myopic strategies,  have
the following special form:  First, each pure strategy a is repeated K times.  This is called
the initialization phase.  Following the initialization phase, at time t a t  is chosen to be a
maxmin strategy in the time-t  game with payoffs  gt.  This strategy is characterized by
the two parameters, K,l   where we recall that l  is the fineness of the grid  pA () .
Theorem:  For any e  there exist K,l  so that the K-initial myopic strategy has
limsup / ct t £e almost surely.
To prove this, we will show that after the initialization period the value of the
period-t  games defined by  gt  remains uniformly small.   Notice that these are not
dynamic games.  Rather, each  gt  corresponds to a “stage game” which is a one-shot
simultaneous-move game with fixed strategy spaces A,X and payoffs determined by the
initial conditions nP tt -- 11 , .4
To find the bounds on the payoffs to the gt, we can use the minmax theorem,
which asserts that the player can guarantee himself exactly min max ( , ) () () gag ÎÎ DD XA t ga  in
each period.  That is, we can suppose that the opponent’s equilibrium strategy  g t X ÎD()
is chosen to minimize the player’s payoff  on the assumption that the player correctly
forecasts g t.
6
The proof shows that the (infeasible) strategy of first performing the initialization,
and  thereafter selecting  pa ()  as close as possible to the actual g t , guarantees that gt
does not exceed the specified bound.  It follows from the minmax theorem that there is a
strategy in the static games that guarantees this result regardless of Nature’s play.
However, our analysis does not reveal  what this strategy is.
 Our theorem follows directly from the following lemmas.
Lemma 1:  For each a  and g t,
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The proof of this, found in the Appendix, consists of algebraic manipulation.
Lemma 2:  If a K-initial myopic strategy is used, then after the initialization phase
g
K
t £
+
+
1
1
2 l
Proof: . Examining the expression for  gt  in lemma 1, we see that the first two terms are
always negative. The third term is bounded by 
1
1 K +
 after the initialization phase, since
every action has been played at least this often.  Intuitively,  the potential period-t
increment to the player’s average prediction error is largest when there are some actions
                                                
6 Since we are discussing the stage game, which is finite, the minmax theorem applies immediately.
Complications can arise in applying the minmax theorem to infinite games. Note that we are not asserting
that the player can correctly forecast the realized value of  xt , but only its distribution.5
that the player has only chosen rarely, for then the expected change in the empirical
distribution  Pa t()  corresponding to a can be large; the initialization phase serves to
bound this maximum increment. Finally, the fourth term in the expression is made less
than or equal to l
2  by picking the a which is closest on the grid to g t .  This gives an
upper bound on the value of the  gt game.
æ
Appendix
Lemma 1:  For each a  and g t,
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Proof:   In what follows we fix g t  and a pure action a.  From the definition of  gt, we
write
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where for notational simplicity we have suppressed the dependence of n,P,p on a, which
is being held fixed.   
First we write out the squares:6
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Next we apply  (( ) ) ( ) yex x y t x t ×= × å gg  for  yp = and  g t y ge y () ,() = å 1  to find
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Examining the expression
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we may check, by multiplying out the final square, that it is equal to the previous
expression, and therefore to  ga tt (, ) g .  Multiplying out the first square, canceling nt-1 in
the second term, and applying  ey ()
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Again apply  (( ) ) ( ) yex x y t x t ×= × å gg , this time for  yP t = - 1  and  g t y g () = å 1  and
combine terms to find
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